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POLITICAL CHANGE AND ABATEMENT OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIME IN MEXICO
PROF. ALEJANDRO POSADAS
The prospects for the abatement of white-collar crime are currently very good
because of the political and historical change Mexico is experiencing. Mexico is
going through a democratic transition that is helping its efforts in this area. For the
first time Mexico has a president from the PAN party.'

There is an emphasis on

prosecuting white-collar crimes and substantial public pressure to institute change.
The challenge is to institutionalize the change within government and society.
Institutionalizing these policies takes time and patience, and requires structural
changes. This paper will review the current change occurring in Mexico and
illustrate the need for the creation of an independent anti-corruption agency.
One of the most important developments involves the ministeriopdblico, or the
federal prosecutor. The powers of the ministeriopaiblicoare very important. Article
2 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General's office establishes that the mandate
of the ministerio ptiblico is supervising and securing the observance of the
constitutional legal order, trying to seek prompt, expeditious and due justice, and
overseeing within the limits of his or her powers that human rights are respected. 2
There are important initiatives being made to effectuate this mandate.
Unfortunately, the majority of Mexican citizens would not associate this mandate
with the ministerio pilblico. This institution is undergoing an intense crisis of its
own, and in order for these policy enforcement efforts to become part of a new
culture of due process and legal order in Mexico, this challenge must be dealt with.
Many citizens and lawyers are concerned because the ministerioptablico requires
that a private person provide them with evidence before they will begin to prosecute
a case. However, this occurs mainly because those prosecutors that do require
evidence from private persons are not doing their job. This happens not only with
fraud in a private scenario, but also in most cases where there is not a high political
will interested in the resolution of that case. The ministerio pdiblico has ample
powers not to press charges, and although empirical evidence does exist, most
lawyers would say that in many cases the office does not press charges. It simply
does not investigate. It does not act.
Mexico also has to contend with overcoming the intense negative attitude and
opinion towards the legal culture. There are many American movies that show
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positive role models for lawyers. However, there are no such Mexican movies.
People who have a career in the United States Department of Justice regularly
participate in conferences, but seldom do career ministerio palblico official
participate in conferences or talk about their experiences. This is not to imply that
participation does not exist or that there are not very good prosecutors in Mexico.
However, practicing and litigating criminal law are not valued within society. There
is not a positive public opinion about the ministerio publico or the work it does.
Given the situation that the country is going through and the great window of
opportunity opened by the democratic change, a change in the public attitude and
opinion toward lawyers should evolve for the better.
To accomplish this change of public opinion there must be increased incentives
to practice criminal law and to pursue a legal education. In many areas such as
money laundering and fraud enforcement efforts, Mexico faces tremendous pressure
from the United States to move and prosecute for those offenses. However, Mexico
itself does not understand where its priorities lie because there has never been any
serious study devoted to this issue. In general, Mexican society regards crimes like
security issues and corruption as being more important than drug trafficking. This
does not mean that the possible connection between them does not exist. This
illustrates the need for a review of Mexico's resources and how best to put them into
play. For example, in the casas de cambio (currency exchange business) context,
the Mexican laws are closing business opportunities in Mexico, but not facilitating
other alternatives. It is easier for a Mexican to open an account in the U.S. than for
that same person to open an account in Mexico. In part, it is much more difficult in
Mexico because many of its citizens do not have sufficient resources or education.
Another challenge is reigning in over-regulation and overreaction. For example,
in Banrural 3 alone, one of the Mexican state-owned banks, there are 600 agents of
the Secretarfa de la Controlarfa de Mdxico (the Office of the Controller General of
Mexico). There are now empirical studies prepared by the Mexican Chapter of
Transparency International showing the negative effects of the growth of the
controller agency in the last six to eight years! In many cases government officials
were prosecuted for technical violations under the law for making decisions that
probably did not constituted illicit or corrupt behavior. Much of this work was done
by the auditors of the controller agency because of the need for some positive
statistics showing that the fight against corruption was being won. The more cases
they initiated, the more favorable they appeared from the Mexican government's
perspective. It did not matter how these cases ended.
Finally, there is a need for an independent anticorruption agency for two separate
reasons. First, although the work being done now is good, it will never be enough
in the eyes of public opinion. Second, independent agencies have had great success
amidst our democratic change. Now that corruption is a priority in the agenda, it
must be legitimized through the creation of an institution that would not shift with
political change.

3. Banco Nacional de Credito Rural, S.N.C., at <http://www.banrural.gob.mx/> last visited 2r7/03.
4. Mexican Chapter of International Transparency, Encuestra Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno,
http:/lwww.transparenciamexicana.org.mx/transparencia.html last visited March 21, 2003.
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The challenges faced by Mexico are still enormous, and there is no way to foresee
what will happen in the future. For example, the new law on administrative
violations for public officials is strict and in some ways overreaching. 5 This law
could be used in negative ways in different political scenarios.
In conclusion, the prospects for the abatement of white-collar crime in Mexico
are very good, but it is also the right time to push further to make the appropriate
institutional changes that are needed to assure that these important policies will
remain and will build the culture of due process and legality that is needed in
Mexico.
SUMMARY GUIDE TO SOME STATUTORY SOURCES OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIME IN MEXICO

Introduction
This document highlights some of the relevant Mexican provisions in connection
with white collar crime. In doing so, it acknowledges the difficulties of defining and
classifying white collar crime. If this task is still subject to debate in the country
where the concept was coined, a more difficult challenge can be expected in Mexico
where the Spanish term "delitos de cuello blanco" has been infrequently invoked in
the public discourse and used almost exclusively by specialized criminal scholars
and legal practitioners. However, the current government has spelled out that the
fight against delitos de cuello blanco constitutes one of the five pillars of its national
public security program. In a speech delivered last April (2002) during the ceremony
establishing a Citizen's Watch Group for the Federal General Attorney Office,
President Fox reaffirmed its government's commitment to combat white collar crime
as a priority.
ConstitutionalFoundations
The criminal legal system in general is subject to Constitutional protections,
principles and limitations. Salient among these are the legality and due process
protections of Article 14 and 16 of the Mexican Constitution. Article 14 establishes
that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions, or rights
without a trial before a previously established court in which the essential
formalities of procedure are observed in accordance with laws in effect prior to
the act.
In criminal cases no penalty shall be imposed by mere analogy on convincing
rationale but rather must be based on a law which is in precisely applicable to the
crime in question.
And Article 16 establishes that:

5. Federal Law on the Administrative Responsibilities of Public Officials (Ley Federal de
ResponsabilidadesAdministrativas de los Servidores Publicos) Diario Oficial de la Federacion, Capitulo

13. 2002. Available through http://www.cddhcu.gob.mx/leyinfoitxt/232.txt last visited March 21. 2003.
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No one shall be disturbed in his person, family, domicile, documents or
possessions except by virtue of a written order by the competent authority stating
the legal grounds and justification for the action taken.
No order of arrest or detention shall be issued against any person other than by
the competent judicial authority, unless such arrest or detention is preceded by
a charge, accusation, or complaint concerning a specific act punishable at least
by imprisonment and there is evidence of proof of a criminal act and the
suspect's probable responsibility.
The same article 16, and articles 17 to 23 contain other protections and rights
directly applicable to criminal matters. Among them, the right not to be detained by
investigators, prosecutors or any other non-judicial authority more than 48 hours
without being released or being turned to a judge; the right of access to the courts
and tribunals to seek justice; the rights of the accused in a criminal trial to be
released on bond if applicable, not to be forced to declare, to be informed of the
charges laid against him and of the name of his accuser, to cross-examine its
accusers before a judge, to hear and respond to the evidence brought against him,
to have a speedy trial, etc.
Pursuant to the nulla crimen, sine lege principle established in Constitutional
Article 14 (reproduced above) and as applied in our civil law system, crimes in
Mexico must be previously and precisely defined by legislation. White collar crimes
are thus found in federal and state statues. I only include in this document crimes of
federal jurisdiction.
Public Corruption
The Mexican legislator has been prolific criminalizing a large variety of types of
public corrupt conduct. The Cddigo Penal Federal (Federal Criminal Code)
dedicates a number of Articles under its Tftulo Ddcimo [Section Tenth] to crimes
committed by government officials. These provisions apply to any person employed
in any capacity (including an agent) by the federal government, by any of its
entities, including state enterprises, by the government of the Federal District, by the
Federal Congress, by the Supreme Court or any federal court. Article 212 establishes
also the applicability of the provisions of Section Ten to State Governors, State
Legislature Representatives and State Judges for the commission of the crimes of
federal jurisdiction established in that section. The same penalties apply to nongovernment officials who collaborate in the commission of the crimes.
Among the crimes established in Section Tenth of the Federal Criminal Code that
can be considered as white collar crimes are the following:
§ Abuso de autoridad: the abuse of official position in its modality of obtaining
from someone else funds, moneys or something of value, which was not
originally entrusted to that official and making a wrong use of it (Article 215
VIII).
§ Uso indebido de atribucionesyfacultades: the misuse of powers or position
to unduly grant, inter alia, permits, licenses, authorizations, concessions or
government contracts with an economic value, tax reductions or unduly
authorize the contracting of public works or other government contracts of
economic value (Article 217).
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§ Concusi6n: the abuse of official position to collect from citizens fees, duties,
taxes or other moneys not owed or in excess of what is due (Article 218).
§ Ejercicio abusivo defunciones: the use of official position to unduly, directly
or indirectly, enter into or grant contracts, permits, licenses or conclude any
other legal agreement that results in an economic benefit to the government
official, his spouse, children, relatives or any person with whom the official
has personal or business relation (Article 220).
§ Cohecho y cohecho a servidores ptiblicos extranjeros: the payment or

solicitation of bribes to and by government officials and the bribing of
foreign government officials (Articles 222 and 222 bis).
§ Peculado: the misuse of government funds or property for private or other
purposes, including their use to politically promote the offender's own image,
or that of somebody else, or to attack the reputation of others (Article 223).
§ Enriquecimiento ilicito: illicit enrichment, namely, the unjustifiable and
unexplainable enrichment of a public official during the tenure of his position
(Article 224).
Obstruction ofjustice
Protections against the due administration ofjustice are found in Section Eleventh
under the heading Delitos cometidos contra la administracidnde justicia. Article
225 establishes a long and to some extent disorganized catalogue of acts considered
to be crimes against the administration of justice. These crimes are offenses
committed by government officials and in particular, by judges or officers involved
in the judicial system. The conducts punished go from maliciously or negligently
delaying or obstructing the administration of justice and forcing an accused person,
by subjecting her to seclusion, torture or intimidation, to make a statement, to a
judge advising a party litigating before her, or a prosecutor initiating a legal
proceeding against a government official enjoying prosecutorial immunity. Article
215 can also be used to prosecute a judge or adjudicator that refuses without cause
to resolve a case before him within the maximum time periods established by law.
The criminalization of acts by private citizens that could fit also the category of acts
against the administration of justice are found spread out in other articles and
statutes. For example, Article 180 of the Federal Criminal Code establishes as a
crime punishable with up to two years in prison acts to resist authority or its agents
in the fulfillment of legitimate duties. This would apply also to judicial proceedings.
Fraud
Article 386 of the Federal Criminal Code defines fraud as illicitly obtaining
something or an economic benefit through deceit or by taking advantage of
someone's error. A fraud for less than the equivalent to 500 minimum wages is
prosecutable subject to the victim submitting a written complaint. If the person
accused makes due reparation the judge may acquit if none of the accusers opposes
the motion (Article 399 bis of the Federal Criminal Code).
Tax Crimes
Mexico has a sophisticated and complex set of tax legislation. The main statue
is the Cddigo FiscalFederal (Federal Fiscal Code). The Fiscal Code establishes a
number of tax related administrative offenses and crimes. The principal authority
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charged with administering the Code is the Secretarfa de Hacienda (Finance
Secretariat). However, only the MinisterioPblico, which works under the General
Attorney's Office, can bring criminal charges before a judge in Mexico. However,
in order for the Ministerio Pablico to prosecute someone for a tax crime under the
Fiscal Code, the Finance Secretariat must generally file a complaint and in certain
cases declare that the Federal Treasury has suffered or could suffer harm. The Fiscal
Code punishes with up to six years imprisonment the covering up of a tax crime
(Article 96).
Contraband and tax fraud are criminal conduct regulated in Articles 102-110 of
the Federal Fiscal Code. Article 111 of the Fiscal Code criminalizes the
establishment of off-book accounts and in general the use of two or more accounting
systems with different contents, as well as the partial or total concealment, alteration
or destruction of accounting systems, records, or relevant documents. Other
practices listed in Article 83, such as inadequately identifying transactions,
recording non-existent expenditures, entering liabilities with incorrect identification
of their object, and using false documents constitute administrative law offences
under the Fiscal Code subject only to non-criminal fines.
Securities Crimes and Crimes againstFinancialInstitutions

Securities crimes and crimes against financial institutions are spread out in
different statutory provisions. For example, the Federal Criminal Code criminalizes
the illicit tampering of financial institutions' computing systems and the damage and
modification of their information. Other prohibited conduct in connection with
financial institutions is found in the Ley de Institucionesde Crddito;the Ley Federal
de Instituciones de Fianzas; the Ley General de Organizaciones y Actividades
Auxiliares de Crddito; and the Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades
Mutualistasde Seguros. Articles 52, 52bis-52bis of the Ley del Mercadode Valores

[Securities Exchange Act] establishes securities crimes, including, inter alia,
recording of false or misleading information or omitting recording relevant
information; revealing confidential information; unduly taking advantage of
insiders' information, and; fabricating and distributing false or misleading
information in connection with securities transactions.
Regulatory Crimes: environmentalcrimes

In 1996, the Federal Criminal Code was amended to introduce a new section
(Tftulo Vig6simo Quinto) under the heading Delitos Contra el Ambiente y la

Gesti6n Ambiental [Crimes Against the Environment and Environmental Policy].
Articles 414 to 423 regulate environmental crimes, including the illicit handling of
hazardous substances; polluting air, land and water harming the environment; acts
threatening or affecting biodiversity and the ecology; illicit use of genetically
modified products, and; the unlawful handling of hazardous or radioactive products.
The prosecutor does not need a complaint to investigate and prosecute
environmental crimes. This section also established the ability of the judge to
impose compensation and sanctions to mitigate the environmental harm.
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Money Laundering

Article 400 bis of the Federal Criminal Code establishes the crime of operaciones
con recursos deprocedenciailicitaor money laundering. This crime was introduced

in Mexican legislation in 1996. The Code imposes penalties of 5 to 15 years in
prison and economic fines up to the equivalent of 5,000 days of minimum wage to
whoever launders money knowing it is the result or proceeds of a crime. The scope
is broad as the offense is predicated on the commission of any crime whether it is
committed inside or outside Mexico. The same punishment is applicable to
employees of financial institutions who aid or help others commit this crime. If the
offender is a government official in charge of preventing or combating crime the
prison sentence can be increase by one half. In order for the prosecutor to exercise
the criminal action, it is necessary that the Secretarfa de Hacienda (Finance
Secretariat) submit a complaint in cases where the money laundering activities use
the Mexican financial system. Both the Secretariat of Finance and the Attorney
General Office are charged with investigating money laundering. This is done
through specialized units in each institution.

